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CHAPTER2 
PORTUGAL AND SPAIN lN THE PROCESS OF 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
SANTIAGO DELGADO FERNÁNDEZ I FILIPA RAIMUNDO 
MIGUEL JEREZ - MIR I ANTÓNIO COSTA PINTO 
lntroduction 
Following a long negotiation process, which took almost eight years, Portu-
gal and Spain signed the Treaty of Accession to the European Com muni-
ties on the 12th ofJune 1985. The signature was accompanied by solemn 
acts organized at the cloister of the Jerónimos Monastery in Lisbon and 
the Royal Palace in Madrid. The accession took effect some months later, 
on the 1st ofJanuary 1986. For both countries this moment meant put-
ting an end to a long period ofisolation from Europe, especially prolonged 
in the case Df Spain, for which it started with the Treaty of Vienna in 
1815, almost two centuries earlier. Even though Portugal participated in 
the First World War on the side of the Entente and its troops fought in 
France together with the Brits, in 1939 both lberian countries coincided 
in declaring neutrality as the new world conilict broke out. However, in 
the case of Spain, its initial neutral position was further changed to non-
belligerent, a status which was maintained by the government of General 
Francisco Franco for three long years. During this time Spanish troops 
actual1y got involved in the military conflict, but only to fight the Soviet 
troopS.l Contrary to Spain, and in spite of the ideological proximity Df 
1 Actually, the legal term of non-belligerence, which Spain adopted between the 12'h of 
June 1940 and the 1 SI of October 1943, was also used by Italy and United States during 
the sarne conflict, however, for shorter periods of time. ln June 1941 the government of 
Franco availed itself of its non-belligerent status in order to send troops to the Russian 
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Antonio Oliveira Salazar to the fascist Italy and the lhird Reich, Portugal 
maintained its neutrality during the war due to strategic reasons, the only 
exception being Portuguese limited involvement on the Pacific front, when 
its colony of East Timor was invaded by the J apanese in 1942.2 ln spite of 
these differences in positioning during the war, neither of the two coun-
tries was admitted to the recently created United Nations (UN) when the 
conflict ended. ln the case ofFranco's regime, the General Assembly even 
officially condemned the regime qualifying its government as fascist and 
recommended the withdrawal of diplomatic representatives from Madrid 
for alI UN member states. ln the case ofPortugal, however, in 1949, shortly 
after the commencement of the Cold War, Salazar made it possible for his 
country to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in spite 
of being the only member state of the alliance which has never actualIy 
broken off its diplomatic relations with Germany3. Some years later, in a 
similar context and equally taking advantage of the anti-communist argu-
ment, Franco's regime initiated a process which led to the overcoming ofits 
complete international isolation with the signature of the Pacto de Madrid 
with the United States in 1953, followed by the Concordat with the Holy 
See in the sarne year. Even though both Spain and Portugal were finally 
admitted to the UN in 1955, they remained marginalized from the process 
of European integration due to a lack of acceptance on part of the states 
which were shaping the European project at that point. 1he objections in 
relation to the undemocratic character of both regimes-especialIy strong 
in the case of France and the United Kingdom-remained present for a 
long time.1his situation has been reinforced by the fact that both Salazar 
and Franco initially kept the democratic Europe at a distance, afraid of a 
contagion effect. Nevertheless, as time passed, they were obliged to recon-
sider and soften their positions. 4 
front -the Blue Division and the Blue Squadron- to fight the Soviet troops under the 
Germans. Even though the Blue Division was officially dissolved in 1943, the last Span-
ish troops have not been repatriated until March 1944. 
2 Even though Portugal never formally proclaimed war on Japan, Portuguese military and 
civil staff fought together with Australian and Dutch troops against the Japanese invad-
ers. 
3 Salazar even sent an official message of condolence on the death of Adolf Hitler. 
4 ln the case ofGeneral Franco, his position was induced by the fear ofhumiliation which 
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ln spite of these seemingly similar paths, during the three decades 
which passed between the start of the European integration process and 
the accession of Portugal and Spain, the positions adopted by their respec-
tive governments and their paths towards the EU were not entirely coinci-
dental. Spain, which unlike Portugal has been excluded from the Marshall 
Plan, joined the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) in 1959 and three years later commenced the negotiation 
process seeking an economic agreement with the European Communities. 
Portugal, on the other hand, chose to support its traditional ally, the United 
Kingdom, and its proposal of creating the European Free Trade Associa-
tion (EFTA) together with other states like Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, and Switzerland (Royo and Manuel,2003: 1). ln the case ofSpain, 
which, as we will see below, witnessed substantial economic development 
by the end of the 1960s, a preferential trade agreement with the EEC was 
signed in 1970. However, no further steps were taken, no doubt due to the 
obvious lack of democratic rule and the absence of a will to at least devel-
op in that way, which contravened the requirements included explicitly in 
documents such as the Bilkerbach Report and the Saragat Memorandum. 5 
However, the situation became quite different with the processes of 
democratic transition experienced by both lberian nations in the 1970s 
(Linz and Stepan, 1996). From the start, their new democratic govern-
ments exhibited a strong desire to emulate the politicaI stability and eco-
nomic prosperity of their European neighbours, convinced that EEC ac-
cession would contribute substantially to the consolidation of their recently 
established democratic institutions and that it would have a positive impact 
5 The Bilkerbach Report concerned politicai and institutiooal aspects of membership and 
association with the EEC and it was presented at the European Parliamentary Assembly 
00 the 1511, ofJanuary 1962. The Saragat Memorandum, 00 the other hand, was prepared 
by the Italian government io May 1964 and it was addrcssed at the Council ofMinisters. 
Both documents established the impossibility of inclllding a non-democratic state in 
the European Commllnities. Nevertheless, the former document inclllded the possibil-
ity of association for those states that attained a certain level of economic and political 
development, under the condition of demonstrating sllfficient wiU to evolve towards 
democratic rllle (Powell, 2007). ln the case of Spain, the Law of the State (Ley Orgânica 
de! Estado - LO E) entailed a certain degree of constitlltionalization of the regime as it 
introduced the distinction between the Hcad of State and the President of the Govern-
ment, even though it did not actually imply any real democratization of the system. 
27 
Ibe1"ian Elites and the EU 
011 the process of economic modernization in both countries (Royo and 
Manuel, 2003: 1). 
Since the accession to the European Communities until nowadays, 
Portuguese and Spanish politics, economy and society seem to have be-
come successfully accommodated within the community framework. 1heir 
inclusion in the European project resulted in important and clear advan-
tages for both countries. Stntctural funds received from the EC allowed for 
considerable improvements in both infrastructure, as well as social capital. 
Moreover, trade with other member states intensified considerably and for-
eign investment increased substantially i11 both countries. Since the 1980s 
the per capita income in Spain and Portugal has been steadily rising, and 
after two decades it reached the level of83 and 74 per cent of the EU mean, 
respectively (Royo and Manuel, 2003: 5). However, due to the serious eco-
nomic difficulties both countries experience since 2008 and the role of the 
EU in the remedies applied, we might put these gains into perspective. ln 
any case, it must be noted that the parallel inclusion ofPortugal and Spain 
in the European Communities triggered a substantial improvement of 
their bilateral relations, reflected in a considerable increase of trade between 
them. Only two years after the accession, the value of goods imported from 
Portugal to Spain increased to a much greater extent than that of any other 
country, while Spain became one of the second supplier to the Portuguese 
economy, surpassed only by the Federal Republic of Germany. What is 
more, Spanish direct foreign investment in the neighbouring country, and 
vice versa, increased substantially in the years that followed the accession. 
Apart from the benefits and losses which might have been derived 
from joining the European project, Spain and Portugal have contributed 
substantially to the general process of European integration by promot-
ing the development of European institutions and politics. ln this sense, 
both countries cooperated in the passing of the Single European Act in 
1986, and the European Union Treaty (Maastricht) in 1991, as well as its 
subsequent revision in Amsterdam in 1999. 1hey also participated actively 
in the establishment of the European Single Market; in the enlargement 
to fifteen member states with the accession of Sweden, Finland and Aus-
tria in 1995; in the negotiations leading to the signature of the Schengen 
Treaty in 1995, as well as in debates related to the Eastern enlargement 
process during the Nice summit in 2000. Portugal and Spain most certainly 
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have proved to be unyielding supporters of the process of integration, and 
contributed actively to moving forward in the direction of more and better 
Europe. 
On the pages which follow we summarize the milestones of the process 
of European integration in Spain and Portugal and assess their experience 
after 25 years of membership in politicai, institutional, and partially eco-
nomic terms. As far as the milestones of the EU integration are concerned, 
portuguese membership in the EU can be divided into three main periods. 
lhe first period covers until the first Portuguese Presidency in 1992, which 
was characterized by the pragmatic approach of the centre-right Cabinet of 
Cavaco Silva.1he second period was characterized by a significantly more 
Euro-enthusiast approach, almost a "golden-age," until the emergence of 
the first signs of economic stagnation and the negative impact of the cen-
tral and Eastern European enlargement at the beginning of this century. 
lhis new juncture opened what some called the "realistic phase" (Soares, 
2007). 6 ln the case of Spain, we can distinguis h four main periods. The 
initial stage starts with the accession of Spain in January 1986 and ends 
with the European Council ofMaastricht in 1991. A second phase, which 
might be deemed as that of crisis and redefinition of European politics, 
lasts from Maastricht tiU the resignation of socialist Prime Minister Felipe 
González in 1996. A third period can be linked to the two terms of Prime 
Minister José María Aznar from the People's Party (PP), until March 2004, 
when the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) returned to power. 7 The 
last period of interest is that between the return to power of the socialists 
and their electoral defeat in 2011 and the formation of the government of 
Mariano Rajoy, in December 2011. 8 As far as the second objective of as-
sessing Portuguese and Spanish experience of 25 years of EU membership 
is concerned, we present various indicators related to politics, economy, and 
society. ln this manner we obtain an accurate image of lights and shadows 
of Spanish and Portuguese membership in the European community. 
6 We adopt here the periodization of Soares (2007), although without using the main 
definitions of each period which the author characterizes as: the Euro-sceptical period, 
the Euro-enthusiastic phase and the Euro-realistic stage. 
7 These initial three periods fit those proposed by Charles Powell (2003: 147; 2008:109). 
8 The politicai and institutional phases do not coincide with the economic developments 
(see Forner, 2012: 257). 
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The process of incorporation of Portugal and Spain to the 
European Community 
7he Portuguese Case 
Portugal's approach to the construction of Europe between 1945 and 
1974 was determined by several factors: it accepted the economic aspects 
of intergovernmental co-operation whilst rejecting the politicaI facets and 
any supranational or integrationist model; it was dependent upon the nar-
row scope of the regime's foreign policy-that is to say, it was determined 
by economic and social factors (e.g., foreign trade, emigration, and tourism) 
and not as a result of any strategic choices-Europe was a necessity, not a 
projecto If during the 1940s and 1950s Portugal's attitude towards the con-
struction of Europe seemed compatible with its idea of the complementa-
rity of Africa and Europe, then during the 1960s and 1970s its economic 
approximation to Europe and the ongoing colonial wars put an end to 
this illusion, a conception that was now seen to be politically antagonistic 
(Pinto and Teixeira, 2004).1he maintenance of the African colonial empire 
required the continuation of authoritarianism, while Portugal's integration 
into Europe required decolonisation and democratization. Opting for the 
European path was the great politicaI innovation of the nascent Portuguese 
democracy. 
Portugal did not experience the sarne levels of international isolation 
as its Spanish neighbour following the Second World War. Its status as 
a founder member of NATO and participant within other international 
organizations, such as the European Organization for Economic Co-oper-
ation (EOEC) and the European Payments Union (EPU), and its receipt 
of Marshall Plan funds-albeit on a relatively small scale-are alI exam-
pIes of the country's international acceptance. Being excluded from, and 
remaining mistrustful of, the Treaty ofRome which marked the foundation 
of the EEC, and following positions adopted by the United Kingdom (its 
major trading partner), membership of the European Free Trade Associa-
tion (EFTA) was to be an important economic aim for the dictatorship 
throughout the 1960s. Negotiated on terms that were favourable to Por-
tugal, which saw the majority of its economic activities largely protected, 
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the EFTA agreement was one of the roots of 1960s economic growth and 
for the significant incre ase in commercial relations with Europe. It was 
also behind the emergence of interest groups with fewer associations with 
the colonies.1he development of a pro-European outlook was essentially 
a consequence of decolonization and the institutionalization of democracy, 
however. 
ln a situation in which conditioning factors weighed heavily and the 
roam for manoeuvre of Portuguese foreign policy was limited, EFTA pro-
vided the only alternative with economic advantages and without politi-
caI cost. Politically, therefore, EFTA represented the optimum solution for 
Salazar as it enabled him to reconcile Portugal's economic integration into 
a European free trade zone with the regime's politicaI and diplomatic posi-
tions.1he strictly intergovernmental character .of the organisation elimi-
nated any supranational or integrationist ambition, and, while it incorpo-
rated some continental countries, Britain's involvement allowed Portugal 
to keep its essentially Atlanticist orientation and the continuation of the 
British Alliance, one the country's traditional foreign policy strategies. 
Most importantly, the fact that EFTA was a free trade zone rather than a 
customs union, allowed Portugal to remain within the organisation whilst 
maintaining its privileged relationship with its colonies. ln the context of 
Portuguese foreign policy's limited scope for manoeuvre, this represented 
an enormous politicaI advantage and was the main reason for Portugal's 
membership ofEFTA. 
With the United Kingdom's renewed request for EEC membership 
and its resignation from EFTA, this organization's future was irredeem-
ably compromised. Once again the unilateral nature ofBritain's application 
ruled out any opportunity for multilateral EFTA-EEC negotiations capa-
ble of dealing with the Portuguese case. Portugal had to form some type of 
relationship with the EEC, and it would have to negotiate it directly and 
bilaterally. Following Britain, in May 1970 Portugal requested talks with 
the EEC and formed an ad hoc commission, the Inter-Ministerial Com-
mission for External Economic Co-operation that was charged with ana-
lysing the situation and proposing possible alternatives.1he Commission's 
report suggested three alterna tive ways forward for Portugal: accession to 
the EEC, association with it, or the establishment of trade agreements with 
it. Accession was out of the question for reasons mentioned above. Asso-
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ciation would be difficult given that Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome ef-
fectively prevented the EEC from compromising to such an extent for the 
convenience of a country such as Portugal. Establishing trade agreements 
with the EEC thus emerged as the only politically possible alterna tive. The 
Commission recommended that Portugal adopt a moderate and flexible 
negotiating position: moderate in order to avoid raising the colonies in 
such a way as could undermine any agreement, and flexible in the formu-
lation of the agreements so as not to undermine any future membership 
application (Pinto and Teixeira, 2004). 
The trade agreement with the EEC was signed inJuly 1972 and ratified 
short1y after without any problem. The room for manoeuvre in Portugal's 
foreign policy was too narrow to allow the flexibility required to step be-
yond the limits of a trade agreement, and its approximation to Europe and 
the weakening ofEFTA required it to establish new multilateral economic 
relations. This being the case, an agreement with the EEC was an impera-
tive, and a trade agreement was the formula that involved the minimum 
degree of politicai compromise. 
With the breakdown of the Dictatorship and the beginning of decolo-
nization in 1974, the European Commission granted Portugal economic 
assistance while the European Council made its politicai position clear: it 
was ready to begin negotiations, but only on the condition that a pluralist 
democracy was established. Nevertheless, the country's economic condi-
tion, the politicai instability and continuing uncertainty regarding the des-
tiny of the democratic regime during the transitional period ruled out any 
advance from the European front. 
It was the first constitutional government, led by Mário Soares that 
adopted the 'European option'. The first step in this process occurred in 
August 1976 when the Portuguese government successfully applied for 
membership of the Council of Europe. Once a member of this organisa-
tion-which ais o consolidated the international community's recognition 
of the new democratic regime-Lisbon began to outline its next and deci-
sive step: application for accession to the EEC. 
Following a series of successful negotiations in a number of European 
capitais between September 1976 and February 1977, the government 
made its formal application for EEC membership in March 1977. ln May 
1978, the Commission presented a favourable report, clearing the way for 
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the formal negotiations to begin in Luxembourg the following October. 
With the formal application made, and accession negotiations under way, 
the hesitations and polemics over the nature of Portugal's integration had 
finally been superseded, placing Portugal firmly on the European path. 
1he government was motivated by, and based its decision to follow this 
strategic option on, two main objectives. First, EEC membership would 
consolidate Portuguese democracy, and second, EEC assistance would 
guarantee the country's modemisation and economic development. Sev-
eral Portuguese economists remained fearful, with the majority expressing 
grave reservations regarding the impact EEC membership would have on 
some sectors of the Portuguese economy. 
A complex series of negotiations, lasting seven years, followed Portu-
gal's membership applicatioll. An earlier step had been taken in September 
1976, prior to the country's formal application, with the revision of the 
1972 EEC trade agreement through the conclusion of the Additional and 
Financial Protocols, which Portugal interpreted as representing a form of 
pre-membership agreement. Despite these prior agreements, formal ne-
gotiations on Portugal's membership lasted from October 1978 until June 
1985. 
1here are two important domestic factors that can help explain just why 
the accession negotiations for such a small country with a relatively weak 
economy were so complex and drawn out. First1y, Portugal's economic situ-
ation immediately prior to the transition and, more important1y, the eco-
nomic measures that had been taken during the revolutionary period-in 
particular the nationalization of important economic sectors. Secondly, 
continuing governmental instability and the politicai and constitutional 
nature of the Portuguese regime. Following 1976, the democratic regime 
was undeniably pluralist, and was generally considered as such; however, 
the 1976 constitution was a product of the revolutionary period, and con-
secrated within it the Council of the Revolution. It was a democracy, but 
it was a democracy under the tutelage of an undemocratic mílitary institu-
tion. These factors weighed heavily in the negotiations, and delayed their 
conclusion (Teixeira, 2012). 
During the early-1980s, Portugal's democratic regime overcame all of 
these objections. The constitution was revised in 1982 to abolish the Coun-
cil of the Revolution and the National Defence Law, and the armed forces 
33 
Iberiarz Elites al1d lhe EU 
finallyaccepted their subordination to the civilian politicai authorities. By 
1983 Portugal's democracy had been consolidated, thereby eliminating all 
of the domestic obstacles that were preventing the successful conclusion of 
the entry negotiations. 
One external hurdle remained, however. During Europe's southern en-
largement, the EEC was also conducting accession negotiations with Spain, 
a country that had a much larger economy than Portugal's, and which did 
not share its smaller neighbour's history of close relations with European 
economíc institutions. Portugal's diplomatic strategy was to keep its entry 
negotiations separate from those of Spain, in the hope of securing EEC 
accession more rapidly, thus giving it the important status of member state 
prior to Spain's entry. 'lhis tactic was not successful, however, as the Com-
munity's policy was to negotiate with both lberian countries simultane-
ously, with the result that Portugal's accession was delayed a further two 
years, after ali the dossiers on Spain had been concluded. 'lhe culmination 
of the accession process finally arrived in June 1985, when the new govern-
ment, led by Mário Soares, signed the Treaty of Accession. 
1he Spanish Case 
'lhe establishment of the European Communities (EC) in the 1950s 
sparked a debate within the Francoist regime, between those who argued 
for the necessity of joining the Communities (EEC, ECSC, and EUR-
ATOM) and the supporters ofjoining EFTA. Finally, the Spanish govern-
ment opted for the former option and in the early 1960s it made public 
its intention of joining the EC. 'lhis coincided with an internal process of 
liberalization and opening of the Spanish economy, which had started in 
1959 with the adoption of the so-called National Plan of Economic Sta-
bilization. Soon enough it became quite clear that the EC was indeed the 
best option as export oriented agriculture constituted an essential element 
of the Spanish economy and the EC established a common agricultural 
policy as one of its main objectives. On the contrary, EFTA did not make 
agriculture part of its treaties. Another strong argument in favour of the 
EC was that the volume of trade exchange with the six countries was 50% 
higher than that with the EFTA member countries. Last but not least, a 
potential preferential trade agreement with EC countries would suppose 
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an incentive to expand some of the markets which have already become 
important for Spanish exports whiJe at the sarne time it would drive and 
speed up funhe .. structural reforms which were deemed necessary at that 
momento Nevertheless, the admission to E was adjourned sine die due to 
twO basic circumstances: the non-democratic character of Franco regime, 
and the substantial differences in the principal economic indicators be-
tween Spain and the countries of the EC. 
ln spite of these obstacles, in December 1964, following a formal appli-
cation submitted by the Spanish Minister of Foreign Relations Fernando 
María Castiella, the negotiation process was initiated. 'lhese initial nego-
tiations resulted in the signature of a preferential trade agreement between 
Spain and the EC on the 29th ofJune 1970 (Banús, 2002), followed by a 
Protocol signed Oll the 29th ofJ anuary 1973. 'lhe signature of these agre e-
ments had two fundamental consequences. On the one hand, trade advan-
tages -such as the reduction of trade tariffs- boosted commercial exchange 
between Spain and the EC, and, thu5, allowed for a development of the 
Spanish economy towards the leveis of the member states of the European 
Communities. On the other hand, the agreement also implied the opportu-
nity for a first group ofhigh levei officials to become experts on European 
affairs, a group which would become key elite actors in the subsequent 
stages of the negotiation process with the EC. 
After General Franco's death in November 1975, in a context of strong 
unrest stirred by politicai and trade union opposition, King Juan Carlos 
together with Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez led the return to democracy 
via an elite-driven transition process (Higley and Gunther, 1992; Gunther 
et a!. 1995). The resulting dismantling of the Francoist regime in the spring 
oE 1977 was marked by the celebration of the first democratic elections in 
almost four decades, and the passing of the constitution the following year, 
which reconstituted the Spanish state as a parliamentary monarchy. 'lhe 
transition ais o implied a renewed interest in a ful! integration of Spain in 
the international arena. 'lhe first democratic government presided over b)' 
Suárez, initiated talks regarding the complete and defini tive incorporation 
of Spain in the European Communities. For the new democratic authori-
ties, accession to the EC constituted the ultimate recognition of the newl)' 
reconstituted Spanish institutions.'lhe response was positive and the acces-
sion negotiations commenced officially on the 5th ofFebruar)' 1979, onl)' 
35 
Iberiall Elites and the EU 
two months after the approval of the new constitution in a referendum. 
Meanwhile, Spain became a member ofCouncil ofEurope in 1978, which 
was also considered a necessary (but not sufl1cient) condition to be able to 
join the European Economic Community (Díez Nicolás, 2003: 120). 
Initially, EC members, and particularly France, had serious doubts con-
cerning the convenience of enlargement towards the Iberian countries es-
pecially as far as the admission of Spain was concerned.1he issues rel~ted 
to textiles, fishing, free movement of workers, and agricultural policy turned 
out to be the most difl1cult to tack1e during the negotiations, the latter 
being the source of the strongest conflict, where the defence by France of 
its agrarian and fishing interest constituted the principal obstacle to the 
advancement of the processo It was estimated that the accession of Spain 
would increase in 30% the agricultural area of the EC, and, thus, Spain 
would become a direct competitor to France in the production of fruit olive 
oil,. and vegetables. 1herefore, the French government together with Italy 
(dnven by the same concerns), tried to protect their products at all costs 
and put obstacles to the Spanish negotiations in all possible ways, while 
the governments ofGermany, the Netherlands and United Kingdom, sup-
ported openly the accession of Spain. Germany, however, included the ac-
cession negotiations in the wider debates concerning the shape of the com-
mon agricultural policy (CAP) and budgetary issues (Royo and Manuel, 
2003: 12). French objections only started to vanish which the election of 
François Mitterrand as President of the French Republic in 1981 and the 
socialist electoral victory in Spain the following year, with Felipe González 
becoming Prime Minister. 1hen German supportive stance towards Spain 
and Portugal became crucial. On the occasion of the European Council 
summit in Stuttgart in 1983, the Federal Republic ofGermany conditioned 
their approval of the increase in community budget on the accession of the 
two lberian states. 9 Shortly afterwards, during the Fontainebleau summit, 
French opposition was finally overcome. 
1he last phase of Spanish accession negotiations was initiated in 1983. 
~t this p~int the talks .were divided into negotiation packages concerning 
dlfferent IS sues, the mam obstacle being, in most cases, the agreement over 
9 "!e should also take into account the link between German support for Spanish acces-
slOn and the commitment ofPrime Minister González to the incorporation ofSpain in 
the European defence system, most importantly through NATO membership. 
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transitory periods. ln spite of these difl1culties, between December 1984 
and March 1985 agreements were reached regarding the main negotiation 
topics.111C l'emaining chapter were closed on the 26th ofMarch 1985, be-
ing the only issue left the bilateral negotiation between Spain and Portu-
gal on e1'1liJlg their spccial transitor)' regime and the specific instruments 
of accession. FinaJly, the Trcaty of Accession of Spain has been signed on 
the 12th ofJune 1985, in Madrid. 
During all these years of arduous negotiations, a widespread consensus 
existed among the principal politicaI and social actors in Spain. Even if 
different conceptions ofEuropean integration coexisted, the prevailing dis-
course was markedly pro-European. Since the end of the dictatorship and 
alI through the transition process, Spanish politicaI parties, together with 
most representative trade unions and business associations understood that 
joining the European Communities constituted a guarantee for democratic 
consolidation in Spain. Moreover, it was believed that EC accession would 
not only be instrumental for obtaining a defini tive international accept-
ance, but also for the modernization of the Spanish productive structure. 1O 
European integration was also favoured by the full support Spanish 
society showed to the process right from the beginning (López Gómez, 
2011). According to public opinion surveys, the perception of the Euro-
pean Communities exhibited by Spanish citizens was already quite positive 
during the last years of the dictatorship and remained that way during the 
whole period of negotiations between 1979 and 1985. ln 1968, according 
to the studies developed by the Spanish Public Opinion lnstitute (renamed 
Centre for Sociological Research after 1977) 74% of Spaniards supported 
joining the EC (with only 2% against it).1hese figures remained basically 
constant in the subsequent waves of the survey: 73% versus 7% in 1971, 
73% versus 4% in 1976, 68% versus 4% in 1979, and 70% versus 6% in 
1984. 11 ln a similar vein, in the Eurobarometer survey of October and No-
vember 1985 we can observe that the responses to the question "Do you 
10 Spanish parties attitudes towards European integration are further discussed in the 
works of Avilés (2004:409-423) and Folguera (2012:126). For h,rther discussion of the 
role of trade unions in the accession process and the strengthening of the negotiation 
position ofSpain, see Zufiaur (2007: 62). 
11 REIS, "La opinión pública espanola ante la Comunidad Económica Europea, 1968-
1985," in Revista Espaiiola de Investigaciones Sociológicas (REIS) (1985),29: 289-396. 
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think your country membership in the European Community would be: a 
goocl tbing / a bad thing / neithcr good nor bad thing" in Spain remain at 
simiJar levels as in Belgium and France 12. 
Portugal and Spain in the European Union 
Portugal 
1he Single Ellropean Act (SEA), signed in February 1986, one month 
after Portugal's accession, re eived a discreet welcome in the COlll1try. lhe 
politicai eli te doubted Portugal's ability to meet the new demands. 131n tlle 
final Act and Declarations of the EA, Portugal introduced a declaration 
on Arricles 59, second paragraph, and 84 of the EEC Treaty where it was 
~on~idere~ that "as the change from unanimous to qualified majority vot-
Ing Hl Arttcles 59, second paragraph, and 84 was not contemplated in the 
negotiations for che acces ion ofPortugal to the Comml1nity and substan-
tiallyalters the Community acqllÍS, it must not damage sensitive and vital 
se tor of the Portl1guese economy, and, whercver necessary, appropriate 
and specific transitional measures hOllld be introdllced to fore tall the ad-
verse consequences that could ensue for these sectors." 
ln this respect, tbe opening ofPortugal's economy meant the country's 
accession had to be followed by compcnsatory economi measures.1l1e 
Portuguesc government, led since 1987 by Anibal Cavaco Silva, followed 
a s~ratcgy that focused 011 the credibiJity offull Portuguese membership, 
whlle at the sarne time secking to protit from the economic and social ad-
vantages arising from EEC participation. Following the approval of the 
DeJors 1 plnn, lreland and the countdes of southern Europe received con-
siderable leveis of financial compensation to help them roeet tbc chalJeng-
es of an increasingJy liberalized European rnarket. This was decisive for 
changing Portugal's perception of Europc, as the Lisbon government was 
one of the main beneficiaries of tbese mensures and tbe massive financial 
transfel's reodered clear and visible the advantages of intcgratiol1. At tbe 
12 Data from Eurobarometer n. 24, December 1985. Public Opinion in the European 
Commullity and in Spain and Portugal at the end of 1985. 
13 Wc largcly base this section in Teixeira (2012), and Teixeira and Pinto (2003). 
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same time, during the early years of membership, Portuguese prudence 
and the pragmatism of Cavaco Silva's governments ensured Portugal re-
taíned its Atlanticist position. Portugal remained alígned wíth the United 
Kíngdom, belíeving Mal'garet 'lhatcher' .government .were safe and .pr~­
dent allies with which to face the growwg supranatlOnal trends wlthm 
Europe. 
After the end of the Cold War and wíth the central European enlarge-
ment and deepening that was the result of the Maastricht Treaty, Lisbons 
osition evolved into a more flexible one. 'lhis became evident in 1992, 
~hen for the first time Portugal assumed the presidency of the EU, which 
marked a change in the process of Portugal's integration. 'lhe Portuguese 
success in ensuring reform of the Common Agricultural Polícy (CAP), 
contributed to changes in the position of Cavaco Silva's cabinet, initiating 
a period of enthusiasm towards more active particip.ation in :he .European 
project. While the EU entered a ne~ stage followmg the slg.nmg of the 
Maastricht Treaty, Portugal revealed Itself to be truly comnutted to the 
European processo With the end of the Cold War, Portugal's international 
position became increasingly Euro-Atlantic, reflecting the Europeaniza-
tion of Portllgal's strategic orientation. 
1l1e followíng ten years were a 'golden era' during which there was a 
large degree of pro-European consensus within the Portuguese party sys-
tem, accompanied by economic growth and rising incomes as well as real 
social change. It was in such an environment that the proportion of the 
population believing EEC membership was a good thing rose from 24.4% 
in 1980-82 to 64.5% in 1986-90, rising to more than 70% during the 
early 1990s. ln 1993,65% of Portuguese interviewees believed the coun-
try's economic development had been great1y boosted as a result of EEC 
membership (Cruz, 1993). 
lnternationally, Portugal used its stronger position as a member of the 
EU to resolve the tensions with its former colonies in Africa. 'lhe opti-
mism of the 1990s was also marked by Portugal's meeting the conver-
gence criteria for adhesion to the European single currency, the Euro, and 
joining it in 1999-2000. 
'lhis momentum of the 1990s would be in contrast with the situation 
at the beginning of the following decade.'lhe EU's movement towards in-
stitutional reform and enlargement, as well as the eventual reduction of 
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EU financial support, led Portuguese public opinion to a slight but steady 
trend of decreasing Euro-optimism (Pinto and Lobo, 2004). 
On the whole, Portuguese citizens' attitudes towards the EU have been 
positive, both in terms of affective and instrumental views. However, it is 
important to stress that the Portuguese consensus has been mostly based 
on a narrow instrumental view of the benefits of membership for Portugal 
rather than on wider perceptions of the EU as 'a good thing.' 
ln the internal politicai sphere, a large amount of pro-European con-
sensus persisted among the parties holding government positions. The 
mainstream centre-Ieft PS and centre-right PSD, who for many years 
shared around 80% of the e1ectorate, remained largely supPQrtive of Eu-
ropean integration, being this coherent with the wide trend across Eu-
ropean member-states that the mainstream parties concentra te the bulk 
of politicai support for the EU. It should be noted, however, that in the 
Portuguese case, Sanches and Pereira (2010) found a quite consistent vari-
ation within parties according to their governmentl opposition status in 
what regards specific issues of European integration. When in govern-
ment, parties have tended to be strongly in favour of European integration 
in a11 the issues, when in opposition, criticism arises here and there. This 
government/opposition status-based variation deviates from the wider 
spectrum of Southern European member-states, where such variation was 
found to be rather limited. The only exception to the consensual support 
of governing parties was the shift of the right-wing CDS (when it was in 
oppositlon) towards an anti-Maastricht Europe, which was put forward 
bya new generation of party leaders in 1992. This stance would last until 
2002, when CDS was constrained to get back to Europhilia by PSD, as a 
condition to form a new coalition government. 
When the PS won the e1ections in 1995, the socialist government led 
by António Guterres adopted the European monetary union project as its 
main goal in the European integration processo The Lisbon government 
assumed the goal of placing Portugal at the head of the integration pro-
cesso This strategy was reflected in the swift adoption oflegislative changes 
outlined in the EU treaties, particularly, the Amsterdam Treaty. The zenith 
of this strategy was reached when Portugal met all the conditions and was 
accepted into the se1ect c1ub ofEuropean states admitted to the euro. 
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República, Lisboa, February 2006. 
Portugal entered its second presidency of the EU in 2000 with Europe 
as the priority of its national interests. Unlike in 1992, during this presi-
dency the Portuguese government transmitted the image of a country that 
was comfortably in.tegrated into the European proje t, and abJe to mobilize 
its peers to ensure the development and improvement of the Union. ln 
the European Council ofMareh 2000, the Portuguese presidency obtained 
approval for the Lisbon Strategy, a de laration of principIes that sought to 
pJa e thc EU as the world's leading economy withln a decade. The issue of 
empLoyment was put high on the agenda by Prime Minlster Guterres, and 
on that matter the Lisbon Council introduced the issue of new technolo-
gies and the information society, 'eCommerce' and the 'knowledge economy' 
(Edwards and WessaLa, 2001). Portugal was successful in projecting an im-
age of a devoted advocate of the European project (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008). 
The intergovernmental conference ln. Nice, which sought to solve the 
questions left over by the Amsterdam Treaty culminated in a moment of 
Euro-optimism: it gave Portugal a platform upon which it was able to fulfil 
a leadership role in respect of the medium and smaller European states, de-
fending their interests from the demands of the larger states.1his role was 
paramount during the negotiations over institutional reform, at a time that 
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was without doubt one of the most active moments ofPortugal's participa-
tion in the process of European integration (Soares, 2007). 
At the external level, the Portuguese presidency sought to strengthen 
the EU's international presence, benefiting from Portugal's historical rela-
tions with regional areas traditionally linked to its national interest. Suc-
cesses included the approval of the EU Common Strategy for the Mediter-
ranean and the launch of tbe EU-lndia Strategic Partnership following the 
Lisbon Summit.1he Portuguese presidency's two main goals in relation to 
Africa were also achieved: the EU-ACP Cotonu partnership agreement, 
which replaced the Lomé Convention, and the first EU-Africa Summit , 
which took place in Cairo. 
1he euro-enthusiastic climate felt until the beginning of the 2000s con-
trasted with the mood in the following years. With the EU's movement 
towards institutional reform, enlargement and the eventual reduction of 
EU fiscal transfers, there is some evidence of a fear that Portugal could be 
'returning to the periphery,' this perception resulting in the return of'Atlan-











Figure 2.1. The impact ofEuropean accession in Portugal 
(numbers in percentage) 
80,0 77,0 
68 ,0 
Source: Portugal e Espanha 1986-2006, Vinte Anos de Integração Europeia, Assembleia da 
República, Lisboa, February 2006. 
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1he conclusions of the Nice Treaty, coupled with the eastern enlarge-
l11ent of the EU, signalled the beginnlng of the end of Portuguese Euro-
< nthusiasm. At this point, botb internal and externa! factors contribtlten 
rownrds the Portuguese gaining a more realistic perception of their belong-
ing to thc ElIropean Union. On the one hand, in. 2001, the resignation 
01' Prime Minjster António lIterres aod the call for early ele tions, was 
accompanled by an economic and financial downturn based on the faU in 
clomesti consumption and the loss of competitiveness. On the other hand, 
the new member states were more attractive to multinational corporations 
seeking to benefit from the lower wages and skHled labour available in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
Table 2.2. The Portuguese Presidencies of the EU (1992-2007) 
Year 
1992 "Rumo à 
U niãoEuropeia" 
2000 "A Europa no Limiar 
do Século XXI" 
2007 "A Stronger Europe in 
a Better World" 
Events and Achievements 
Signature of the Maastricht Treaty 
Consolidation of the Atlantic relations; 
Lisbon Strategy; 
Security and Defence policy; 
Accession negotiations with the 'He1sinki Six' 
Preparation Df the Intergovernmental Conference 
1st EU-Africa Summit 
Lisbon Treaty; 
1st EU-Brazil Summit; 
Source: Ferreira-Pereira (2008). 
ln this respect, Portugal was unquestionably one of the most affected 
countries by the re1ocation of companies to the east. At this point, it should 
be noted the financial constraints deriving from economic and monetary 
union and adhesion to the euro, as well as the ongoing eco no mie issues af-
fecting Portugal, were aggravated from 2008 by the global financial crisis. 
During the first decade of this century, Portugal's GDP diverged from the 
EU average and from those of its cohesion partners. ln 1999 Portugal's 
43 
Iberia1/ Elites al1d lhe EU 
GDP per capita was 68 per cent ofEU GDP per capita and by 2008 it had 
fallen to 63 per cento 
Despite these circumstances, Portugal was committed to playing a more 
important role in the EU. lhe 2007 Presidency of the EU represented an 
excellent opportunity with José Manuel Barroso as President of the Euro-
pean Commission.1he second EU-Africa Summit and the first EU-Brazil 
Summit are dear examples of that. 
Spain 
lhe admission of Spain in the EU coincided with the signature of the 
Single European Act. As a consequence, Spain confronted a double chal-
lenge upon its accession. On the one hand, the country had to fulfil the 
requirements ofbilateral economic liberalization, as stipulated in the Treaty 
of Accession. On the other hand, it had to simultaneously go beyond that 
and move forward together with the rest ofEC member states towards the 
construction of a single market. At that point, there was much debate about 
the results of the accession negotiations and the toughness of the condi-
tions imposed upon the country. As Jordan Galduf recalls, "in 1985, after 
a decade of a profound economic crisis, the situation of the country was 
very difficult" (2003: 114). Until then, the country's attention was focused 
on politicaI transition and democratic consolidation. However, at that mo-
ment it became necessary to broaden the scope of the process and apply 
economic measures which could not be postponed anymore. Integration of 
Spain in the European Communities constituted a formal path to achieve 
the necessary economic changes, in spite of having to accept and endure 
tough conditions imposed by the new European partners. 
As mentioned above, the first phase ofSpanish participation in the Eu-
ropean project commenced with the accession of Spain in January 1986 
and ended with the European Council ofMaastricht in 1991. During these 
years, the primary objective of the Spanish government was to formulate 
a coherent approach to the EC, which would maximize both internal and 
external benefits of the newly achieved status of member state. 1hree gov-
ernments of socialist majority, presided over by Felipe González, a fervent 
defender of the European project, were entrusted with the task of defining 
the position ofSpain within the European Communities. It is important to 
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note that in sp.ite of some riti i5m from the sectors most severeJy affected 
by the newly acce~te~ conditions, thc acce sioll ?:Spain and the process of 
defining its role wlthlO the European CommulHtles were alway accompa-
nied by a steady support from all social sectors, as well the most prominent 
olitical figures, a situation very different from that in Portugal. pedfical1y, 
~ince the beginning of the Spanish politicaI transition, European integra-
tion remained the point of reference in terms of the international recogni-
tion of the newly reinstated democratic regime for all democratic politicaI 
parties. Therefore, one could observe a perfect continuity in main parties' 
aims and objectives in this respect (Powell et al, 2005: 29-30). A dear ex-
ample of that is the unanimous support for the passing of the Law for 
the authorization of ratification of the Treaty of Accession in the Spanish 
parliament by both lower (Congreso de los Diputados) and upper (Senado) 
parliamentary chambers (Congreso de los Diputados and Senado) the 26th 
of June and the 17th of July 1986 respe tively. Moreover, as mentioned 
above, this was accompanied by a positive evaluation on part of the Spanish 
citizens. 
ln order to overcome the doubts that some member states had expressed 
regarding Southern enlargement, following the signature of the Single Eu-
ropean Act, Spain made a de ar effort to demonstrate that it would assume 
a constructive position within the EC. 14 lhis initial predisposition crystal-
lized in a steady support for all initiatives which would contribute to the 
advancement of European integration. 
Such a constructive attitude succeeded in portraying Spain as a respon-
sible partner, capable of commitment to further advancements in the Eu-
ropean project even beyond its vested interests. 1his was accompanied by 
an understating of the country's difficulties by European institutíons. 1he 
enactment of the single market coincided with the transitory periods fol-
lowing the accession, and, thus, during this time Spanish industrial prod-
ucts, as well as a large part ofits agricultural production became exposed to 
its European competition. 1his is why the European Commission, in the 
1988-1992 financial perspectives (the so-called 'Delors I Package') dupli-
cating the budget aUocated to the previously existing structural funds (the 
European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund) 
14 lhe Organic Law autharizing the ratificatian of the Single European Act by Spain was 
passed by the lower chamber of the Spanish parliament on the 2nJ of October 1986. 
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(Morata, 2000: 150), which made it possible for Spain and other under-









Figure 2.2. European funds in relation to GDP, 
(measured according to prices in 2004) 
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Souree: Month1y report, La Caixa FOllndation, December 2006. 
It was also during this initial stage when Spain identified its principal 
European allies. lt was commonly thought that the main objective was to 
obtain influence in the European Commission. This was the reason why 
Felipe González, even while in the opposition, cultivated his good relations 
with the president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors (1985-
94), whose vision of the European project González fully shared. ln addi-
tion, the years of tough accession negotiations, taught the Spanish govern-
ment that the best way of gaining influence in the EC was through keeping 
good bilateral relations with the governments of Germany and France. 15 
15 During these years the frequency of international summits and bilateral meetings in-
creased, especially with Germany and France, but also with Italy and Portugal. 
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1herefore, during these first years of membership, the Spanish government 
did everything that was possible to maintain its position within the mar-
gins of the Franco-German axis. . 
Relations with France experienced a clear improvement after joining 
the EC, in spite of initial objections to Spain's accession. Regarding Ger-
rnany, prior to Spanish accession, Felipe González supported conservative 
leader Helmut Kohl in his decision to deploy Pershing missiles on German 
sai!, in spite of an open and clear opposition of a significant part of the 
rnembers of the fellow German Social Democratic Party (SPD). ln return, 
Kohl became one of the main advocates of Spanish accession. 16 ln paral-
lel, perceptions of panish public opinion aligned with this strategy dur-
íng thesc years. Thus, while opinions regarding Germany and the Germans 
werc stable during ali this ime, the improvement of the perceptions of 
France and the French was substantial. 
ln the first semester of 1989, Spain held the rotating Presidency of the 
European Communities for the first time. At that moment, the rather suc-
cessful functioning of the single market reactivated the ambitions to create 
an Economic and Monetary Union, as it was established by the Single 
European Act. Upon the conclusion of the Spanish presidency the De-
10rs Plan was approved. 17 Thus, in a way, the Spanish presidency witnessed 
the outset of the process which would lead to a more intense politicaI and 
economic union. Furthermore, Spain contributed to the creation of an at-
mosphere of stability and trust which made possible the signature of the 
Treaty ofMaastricht two years later. Most importantly, some of the greatest 
16 The importance of nurturing the relations with Germany can be nlrther understood 
whel1 we are reminded ofhow Kohl correctly identified the lil1k betweel1 Spanish mem-
bership in the NATO and its accessiol1 to the EC. Kohl understood that by means of 
putting pressure on the Freneh government to lift offits opposition lowards lhe 1berian 
enlargement, he was helping González lo win lhe vole in lhe conlroversial referendum 
ove r lhe penllanence ofSpain wilhin lhe NATO, to be held in March of 1986. 
17 lhe famous Delors Plan was designed to facilitate the progress towards a monetary 
union in three phases, with the creation of a common currency as its final objective. Its 
initial phase was completed in 1993 with the agreement on free movement of capitais 
and the establishmcnt of convergence eriteria for the countries whieh intended to join 
the common currency. The seeond phase was completed in 1998 with the evaluation of 
those countries which complied with thc convergence criteria and the creation of the 
European Central Bank (ECB). The last stage was initiated in 1999 and finalized on the 
1" ofJanuary 2002 when the single currency bcgan to circulate. 
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advancements of the treaty, such as the concept of European citizenship 
and the development of the European policies in the area of Justice and 
Interior AfEürs, were introduced thanks to the Spanish input. 
ln economic terms, the balance of this initial period of Spanish mem-
bership was, in general, positive. ln this sense, between 1986 and 1990, its 
GDP increased at a pace of about 4.8% annual1y, a growth much stronger 
than that experimented in the years prior to the accession. Moreover, the 
volume of trade between Spain and other EC member states grew substan-
tial1y, from 30200 to 69200 million Euros (Forner and Senate, 2012: 270). 
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Term in office 
From 25 July 
1989 until13 
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Position Term in office 
Marcelino 
Commissioner for Transport and From 27 April 
Energy and Commissioner for 1994 until15 
Oreja Institutional Relations, Culture, September 
Aguirre and the Audio-visual Sector 1999 
Vice-President and 
From 1 
Loyola de November 
PaJacio y Commissioner for Relations 1999 until 22 
dei Valle with the European Parliament, 
November 
Lersundi Transport, and Energy 
2004 
From 16 
Pedro Solbes Commissioner de for Economic September 
Mira and Monetary Affairs 1999 untill0 
April2004 
Commissioner for Economic 24 April 
Joaquín and Monetary Affairs, Vice- 2004 untill0 
Almunia Prcsident and Commissioner for February 2010, 
Competition and currently 
From 18 
Javier High Representative of the October 
Solana de Union for Foreign Affairs and 1999 until30 
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From 10 March 
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1994 until 
Mira 
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February 1998 
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President of the European 
Salat 
Economic and Social 
Committee 
From 16 
Juan Manuel President of the European Court January 2002 
Fabra of Auditors untilJanuary 
2005 
Source: own c1aboration. 
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1he second period which can be discerned in Spanish membership in 
the EU commenced in 1993, after the signature and passing in Spain of the 
Treaty of the European Union, and lasted until the end of Felipe Gonza-
lez's last government, in 1996. During these years, the socialist leader knew 
how to compensate his growing internal discredit, with a strong presence 
in the European politicaI scene, remaining in line with the Franco-German 
axis.1his was a phase of maturing in Spanish participation in the European 
integration processo lt is at this point that Spain was able to combine its 
steady support for the development of the European project, with a defence 
of its legitimate interests as a country.1herefore, even though in the previ-
ous years Spain occupied positions relevant to the European project, it is in 
this period when its presence was intensified. 
Table 2. 4. Economic change in Spain, 1986-2009 
Indicator 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2009 
1. GDP growth in Spain 
2,3 2,5 2,4 2,8 2,7 -3,6 
(annual change %) 
2. GDP growth in the EU 
2,5 1,8 1,6 1,7 1,9 -4,2 
(annual change %) 
3. Per capita incorne 
85* 90' 93,3 98,1 104,6 102,6 
convergence (EU-27=100) 
4. Unernployrnent in Spain (%) 17,3 13,2 18,1 10,6 10,3 18,8 
5. Unernployrnent in the EU 
9,3 7,6 10,1 7,2 8 9,5 
(%) 
6. Inflation in Spain (%) 9,3 6,4 3,5 3,3 3,6 -0,3 
7. Inflation in the EU (%) 3,5 5,6 2,6 2,3 2,2 1 
8. Short terrn interest rates (%) 10,6 11,7 7,5 4,7 3,1 1 
9. Public deficit (% dei PIB) 6,2 4,3 6,6 0,9 -2,0 11,2 
10. Public debt (% dei PIB) 42,3 44,3 68,1 57,8 39,6 53,2 
11. Financial balance with the 
- 109 3709 6952 
EU (rnillions ofEuros) 
6026 4998 3028 
(*) estirnated 
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'Ibe second Spanish presidency of the EU took place during this sec-
ond pbase, between June and Decembe( 1995. DlIring this Presiden y, and 
within the framework of the EU Mediterranean policy, Spain organized 
in Barcelona the ElIro-Mediterranean Ministerial onfercnce where EU 
ITlcJ11ber states met witb the principal Mediterranean non-member COlUl-
tries in order to dls uss the economic stability and prosperity of the region. 
La t but not least, in this period Spain progre ively hanged the di-
rection of its economic policy. Markcd ln the initial years of membersrup 
by high levels of inAation and public deficit, the conditions imposed by 
the Trcaty of European Union, which aimed at forging an Ecollornic and 
Monetary Union, obliged the Spanish Government to shift the direction in 
its economy policy to achieve a reduction in both indicators. 
The third period ofSpanish membership in the EU covers the two terms 
José María Amar was president of the government, between 1996 and 
2004. During these years Spain faced important new challenges, of which 
joining the MonetalY Union undoubtedly constituted the most significant 
one. ln order to meet the Convergence Criteria established by the EU, the 
first government of the Popular Party (PP) made an effort to reduce infla-
tion, public defici t, interest rates, and public debt. 18 As a result, Spain joined 
the common European currency in 1999 and on the 1st ofJanuary of2002 
after meeting the tough criteria. The introduction of Euro notes and coins 
into circulation coincided with the second Spanish Presidency of the EU. 
The other two milestones of this period were the signatures of the trea-
tíes of Amsterdam and Nice.1he former was ratified by the lower chamber 
ofthe Spanish Parliament on the 1st ofOctober 1998 and carne into force 
in May 1999.1he treaty implied the strengthening of the role of the EU in 
some policy areas, such as the establishment of an employment policy and 
the creation of the Area ofFreedom, Security and Justice. ln addition, the 
Treaty aimed at addressing the issue of the distribution of power among the 
18 lhe Sllccess in meeting these objectives was partly due to the policies of liberalization 
and deregulation.lhese policies resulted in privatizations, already initiated by the previ-
ous socialist government; land market liberalization, with the consequent increase in 
public incorne due to the parallel growth of the construction sector; as well as a decrease 
in taxes for cornpanies and, to a lesser extent, families, among other measures. Neverthe-
less, the general fiscal pressure did not decrease in comparison to previous periods. Credit 
cxpansion caused by a reduction in interest rates which accompanied the introduction of 
the cornmon currency was the key factor which triggered the real estate bubble. 
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different member states in the decision-making structures of the Council 
of the EU; however, it only did so in a vague and provisional manner. One 
of the institutional innovations introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
was the figure of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, who at the sarne time held the position of Secretary 
General of the Council of the European Union. Javier Solana, who pre-
viously served as a Spanish Minister and NATO Secretary General, was 
appointed to the newly created position in 1999. 1he Treaty of Nice, on 
the other hand, was ratified on the 6th ofNovember 2001, and carne into 
force on the 1st ofFebruary 2003. By approving the Treaty ofNice, Spain 
accepted the redistribution of power in aU democratic institutions of the 
EU.1he Spanish government attained a favourable position in terms of the 
new power distribution in the Council; nevertheless, it was achieved at the 
expense of a rela tive loss of power in the European Parliament-from 64 to 
50 seats, which represented a decrease in the relative weight from a 10.2% 
to a 6.8%. Besides, Spain (like other large member states) lost one of the 
two seats in the European Commission. 
1he second term ofJosé María Aznar as prime minister entailed a radi-
cal shift in Spanish foreign policy and a transformation of its policy to-
wards the European community. Transatlantic relations, especially with the 
USA, became prioritized over relations with the EU and, especial1y ove r 
the traditional allies of the Franco-German axis. 1hus, the integrationist 
position which traditionally had characterized Spanish participation in the 
European project was substituted by an intergovernmentalist stance. Dur-
ing the first semester of 2002 Spain took over the EU Presidency for the 
third time, coinciding with the issuance of the Euro. 
1his review of Spain's membership in the EU doses with the period 
initiated with the socialist victory in the 2004 parliamentary election and 
concludes in the late 2011 with the formation of the new government pre-
sided over by Máriano Rajoy Brey. 1his last stage was characterized by a 
new strategic shift aiming to recover good re1ations within the EU, es-
pecially with Germany and France. Moreover, the new socialist govern-
ment became one of the firmest supporters of the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe. 1hus, Spain became the first country in which 
the Constitutional referendum was held with a result of a 76.7% of the 
vote in favour of the Constitution. Both main national parties, PSOE and 
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PP, together with the Catalan nationalists of Convergencia i Unió, and 
the Basque Nationalist Party called for a favourable vote on the treaty. On 
the contrary, most of the formations 011 the left of the PSOE opposed the 
treaty and, thus, campaigned for a negative vote. 
Following a definitive rejection of the constitutional Treaty as a conse-
quence of the negative Dutch and French votes, the European Union was 
forced to change its objectives. After long debates which went on for more 
than two years, finally on the 13th ofDecember 2007 the Treaty ofLisbon 
was signed, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Community. 









Progress in directives regarding the establishment of the Single 
Market and the Economic and Monetary Union 
Adoption ofthe Community Charter ofFundamental Social 
Rights ofWorkers 
Progress in Common Foreign Policy 
Name for the Common Currency 
Establishment of a schedule for the introduction of the Common 
Currency 
Introduction of Euro notes and coins in twelve countries 
Announcement of the Convention for the future of Europe 
Foundations for a common policy on illegal immigration 
Ratification of the Kyoto protocol 
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism and European 
Financial Stability Facility (better known as bailout or rescue 
fund) 
Source: Based on Ferreira-Pereira, 2008. (http://www.scielo.oces.mctes.ptlpdf/ri/n20/n20all.pdf. 
available 01 December 2013) 
nis last period conduded with the fourth Spanish Presidency of the 
Union in the first semester of 2010.1he development of the different sec-
tions of the Lisbon Treaty and the introduction of some changes which 
would contribute. to the improvement in the efficiency of the EU consti-
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tuted the principal objectives of this period. Moreover, one of the major 
goals was to provide the EU with instruments which would allow it to play 
a more relevant role in the international arena, for example by means of 
creating a European External Action Service. 
ln sum, in the course of its 25 years of membership in the European 
project Spain became an active participant of the EU decision-making pro-
cesso All these years constituted an opportunity for the country to complete 
a process of profound economic, social and politicaI development, which 
brought it doser to the rest ofits fellow European member states, allowing 
for a real convergence with them. 
Final Remarks 
Table 2.6. Milestones of Spanish and Portuguese Participation in the 
European integration processo 
Spain Portugal 
Membership Application 28 July 1977 28 March 1977 
Signing of the Treaty of Accession 12June 1985 12June 1985 
First Election to the European 
10June 1987 19 June 1987 
Parliament 
Entry into the European Monetary 
19 June 1989 6 April1992 
System 
Accession Protocol: Schengen 
25 June 1991 25 June 1991 
Agreement 
Ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty 8 October 1998 6 J anuary 1999 
Economic and Monetary Union 3rd stage: 1999 3rd stage: 1999 
Ratification of the Nice Treaty 27 December 2001 18 January 2002 
Ratification of the Treaty Establishing a 
Referendum 
Constitution for Europe 
20 February 2005 postponed 
indefinitely 
Ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon 8 October 2008 17 June 2008 
Source: own elaboration. 
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portuguese and Spanish accession to the EEC took place at precisely 
the moment Europe was seeking to strengthen and intensif)r its integration 
through the SEA. 
1hrough European structural funds and the introduction of cohesion 
policies, Portugal's economy and society set out on a process of economic 
and social change. During the first decade it resulted in its convergence 
with its European partners, and its growing divergence since the end of 
that first decade. Politically there was a process ofEuropeanization ofPor-
tuguese institlltions and public policies. 1he transposition of European 
legislatioll rCSlllted in significant change that shaped publlc institutions 
and policies to the practices of European institlltions and their decision-
making processes. During the ourse of this proccss, the costs in terms of 
sovereignty transfer within the various affected sectors seem to have been 
widely compensated by the economic benefits obtained. 
As far as Portugal's foreign policy is concerned the impact ofEuropean 
integration was central, even determining the emergence of a new mod-
e1 for the country's international insertion. It changed the contradictory 
perception between Europe and the Atlantic to one of complementarily. 
While the Europe-Atlantic equation remained, priorities were inverted: 
traditionally Portugal had prioritized the Atlantic and the Mrican colonies 
while looking for European compensations; from 1986 on, Portugal's pri-
ority was Europe and the European Union, seeking to take advantage ofits 
Atlanticist position and post-colonial relations (Teixeira 2012). 
ln the case of Spain, on the other hand, in the course of the 30 years 
which have passed since its accession to the European Union, the country 
has experienced a significant development in the economic, social and po-
liticaI realms.1his process brought it doser to its fellow European states and 
allowed for a genuine convergence with them. EU membership brought 
about the opening of Spanish economy, in spite of the persistence of dif-
ferences in some important areas. 1hese differences, however, have been 
reduced progressively with the help of structural funds received from the 
Community, among other measures applied. Participation in the European 
integration project has also triggered a profound transformation of the 
Spanish society: politicaI culture of Spaniards has been strengthened and 
a number of stereotypes regarding the country has been overcome. Finally, 
Spain proved to be able to assume an active role in the EU decision-making 
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process, even if not always successful in its endeavours, but determined to 
remain an active player in the processo Moreover, Spain has certainly man-
aged to leave its own mark on some of the most significant achievements 
of the European integration processo From the beginning it has supported 
the creation of the common market and contributed to its establishment 
in practice; the country became a member of the Economic and Monetary 
Union and adopted common currency when it was first introduced. Span-
ish authorities have also supported the creation of the European are a of 
freedom, security and justice, as well as the idea of a strong European voice 
in the globalized world which meant strengthening the EU as a unitary 
actor in foreign policy. Spanish membership also facilitated, as mentioned 
before in the case of Portugal, the strengthening of a Mediterranean and 
Latin-American dimensions to the EU, in its cultural, economic and politi-
cal aspecto Without a doubt, Spain is nowadays more politically stable and 
socially dynamic.1he current crisis situation, however, obliges us to be more 
careful when making statements on whether the country is more economi-
cally prosperous than before the accession. 
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